Can the Chinese be trusted again?

The eighth round of Corps Commander-level talks between India and China were held on 6 November at Chushul. After the talks, both sides gave perfunctory diplomatic statements of having had candid discussions on disengagement and to carry the process forward as per the consensus reached between the leaders of the two countries. Prior to this development, it was presumed that the status quo would continue indefinitely.

The Chinese Communist Party leaflet, Global Times, initially denied reports of any understanding reached between the two countries calling such reports appearing in a section of the Indian media and social media as propaganda. Within no time, it altered its position and stated that an understanding was reached, after all. Going by its campaign, it is to be understood that the understanding between the two countries was in line with the Chinese proposals of withdrawals by both.

It means that India would honour the Chinese perception of the LAC and withdraw from the heights of the Kailash range as well from the Finger 4 area of the Pangong Tso and agreed to declaring the area between Finger 4 and Finger 8 as a no-patrol zone. Next, it kept repeating the story that both sides would begin their backward moves at once.

This is sheer absurdity. Why should India withdraw from the current positions of strength and leave the heights it occupied post-Galwan (on the intervening night of August 29-30)? Commonsense tells us that if a position of strength is vacated by India, the Chinese would ensure that they would never again allow us to get back there. Several experts have been warning against trusting the crooked Chinese. Several military experts have expressed their views on this issue advising India against the move.

It is common knowledge that since India secured the dominating heights on the Kailash Range on the night of 29/30 August, during the sixth and seventh round of military talks, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had been persistent that disengagement must begin with our withdrawal from the Kailash Range because India has 'altered the status quo'. Beijing remained ambiguous with respect to disengagement in the Depsang Plains and north of Pangong Tso, claiming that it had merely secured its own territory up to the 1959 Claim Line.

Whoever says that the1959 line is recognized by India. If there is an alteration in the region, it is done by the Chinese who have altered the status of the Line of Actual Control in violation of the 1993 agreement. The problem is that China has now clearly understood that India will be no pushover and its hold over the Kailash range puts spokes in the Chinese plans to control the lower reaches of the Himalayas. China is planning to have an unhindered access upto Daulat Beg Oldi taking away the advantage of India completely so that it could dictate terms to Indians.

What has China proposed here? That the PLA will withdraw east of Finger 8 (north of Pangong Tso) while Indians should withdraw to Dhan Singh Thapa post, west of Finger 3 to create a buffer zone of non-deployment. China does not mention Despong Plains at all. India should beware of this tactic of China creating a buffer zone on the Indian side. If it is done, this will be the costliest mistake of India.