Managing Sonia

In April 1992, Narasimha Rao presided over the Tirupati session of the Congress, the first non-Family prime minister to do so. With Sonia Gandhi still in mourning, Rao had a free hand. The Tirupati session marks the moment when Rao’s rivals within the Congress realized that he was more fox than mouse.

They began taking their complaints about Rao directly to Sonia. Salman Khurshid, then a junior minister, remembers that ‘Rao was seen as an intruder into what was seen as an exclusive Nehru-Gandhi preserve. Sonia consciously opted out.

The trouble was you can take a noble decision, but in the daily functioning there will be any number of people who will say that enough respect was not being paid to 10 Janpath.’

Rao knew that his adversaries were telling tales. His regular conversations with Sonia Gandhi, in person and on phone, were aimed at fighting those fires. The prime minister also went out of the way to address the few requests of the taciturn Sonia, on Rajiv’s legacy, on her family’s security—and on Bofors.

When it came to the Bofors corruption scam, a senior Congressman says that even though Sonia believed in Rajiv’s innocence, she wanted the new government to lighten the taint on her dead husband.

For a year and a half, Rao’s relationship with Mrs Gandhi remained without incident. She refrained from interfering in politics; he obliged her few requests. All of this changed on 6 December 1992, when the Babri mosque was demolished. Sonia Gandhi issued a statement condemning the destruction. It was her first political act.

Though Sonia’s statement did not blame the Rao government, the prime minister took note. He asked the intelligence bureau to keep tabs on 10 Janpath. On 18 December 1992, twelve days after the demolition, the IB replied, ‘The important visitors of Smt. Sonia Gandhi, since December 7, included Arjun Singh (Dec.7 & 14), Digvijay Singh, MP . . . (Dec. 7 & 8) . . . N.D. Tiwari . . . Madhavrao Scindia . . . and Ahmed Patel.’ The report went on to say, ‘During the course of the discussions with Smt. Sonia Gandhi, Arjun Singh, Digvijay Singh, A.K. Jogi, Salamutallah and Ahmed Patel . . . reportedly expressed their unhappiness with the handling of the situation, including by the prime minister . . .’

Narasimha Rao realized he was facing a revolt within his party. Rao responded by turning crisis into an opportunity to consolidate his position. He rallied the non-BJP opposition behind him, reshuffled his Cabinet, and eased out critics. By July 1993, Rao had survived his third and final no-confidence motion in Parliament.

The economy was doing well, and the prime minister felt he was finally in control. Rao’s greatest skill was that he could dispassionately analyse his faults and frailties, objectively assess the precariousness of his own position.

But political success in 1993 clouded his judgement. Until 1993, Narasimha Rao met Sonia Gandhi almost once every week. Their conversations were brief, but they ensured that Rao could clear any doubts expressed to Sonia by disgruntled Congressmen. These meetings were, however, criticized by opposition parties.

Extracted with permission from Penguin Random House