Redefining India-Russia relationships

St Petersburg Declaration

Marking 70 years of diplomatic ties, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the St Petersburg Declaration in June 2017, envisaging an action plan for deepening relations in all areas, including political and economic development of the two countries and also to ensure that their ties contribute to the establishment of a more peaceful and just world order.

Key Points

• Both the countries will work towards a higher level of military- to- military cooperation by holding regular joint land and sea military exercises and this year both the countries will conduct the first ever Tri-services exercise INDRA-2017.
• Stating that the economies of India and Russia complement each other in the energy sector, it said that they would strive to build an ‘Energy Bridge’ and expand bilateral relations in all areas of energy cooperation, including nuclear, hydrocarbon, hydel and renewable energy sources and in improving energy efficiency.
• According to the Declaration, the growing nuclear power partnership between India and Russia has opened opportunities for developing advanced nuclear manufacturing capabilities.
• It said that connectivity must be strengthened, while reiterating their commitment to build effective infrastructure for the International North South Transport Corridor and implementation of the Green Corridor.
• The Declaration said both India and Russia regard the establishment of the multi-polar global order in international relations and thus, they would enhance collaboration to democratize the system of international relations, based on the principles of the rule of law and the central role of the United Nations.
• Russia reaffirmed its support for India’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
• Both countries strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
• Both the nations called for early conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism to strengthen the global counter-terrorism normative and legal framework to combat this scourge.

Convergence

• In specific areas such as defence hardware and technology, nuclear energy and oil and gas any cooperation is of mutual benefit.
• There may even exist longer-term convergence in helping shape a multi-polar international political and security architecture.

Divergence

• However, these shared interests must be balanced against divergences that are inherent in the very dramatic transformations which have taken place in the two countries themselves, and in the regional and global situation since the end of the Cold War, which have inevitably altered the overall context of our relations.

Problems with Russia

• Russia is a longstanding, time-tested, partner and are a key pillar of India’s foreign policy.
• Both countries have up-graded their relationship from "strategic partnership" to "special and privileged strategic partnership" in 2010.
• Relations between India and Russia have been based on defence acquisition, hydrocarbons, nuclear energy, space cooperation, trade and commerce, science and technology, culture and people to people ties.

Current Problems

• The rapidly expanding ties between India and USA after the nuclear deal in 2008.
• The growing defence relationship between India-US. Russia is still the largest supplier of defence equipment(70%) but its share in overall imports has progressively declined.
• India’s decision to sign the three ''foundational'' defence Agreements with US has surfaced as a cause of serious concern for Russia.
• Logistics Support Agreement (LSA),
• Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA)
• Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geo-spatial
• Cooperation, Russia feels that India is virtually entering into a military alliance with USA, which will severely restrict Russia's ability to share sophisticated defence technology with it.
• The frequency and comfort level in meetings between Modi and Obama are perceived to be higher than with Putin.
• Russia’s defence agreement with Pakistan.

Opportunities

• Modi and Putin need to give much greater personal attention to building and strengthening the India-Russia partnership and should not delegate this work to Foreign Ministers or Foreign Offices.
• The significance of defence exports for Russia has grown considerably over the last few years, as the prices of oil and gas, on which it is heavily dependent, have declined precipitously.
• India should quickly conclude some visible, high-ticket, defence deals with Russia.
• The import and progressive manufacture in India of KAMOV-226 helicopters, can be a game changer.
• Modi and Putin need to have a frank conversation about India’s growing relations with USA.
• Modi should make Putin appreciate that India’s expanding ties with USA are neither at the expense of Russia nor are they in any way directed against Russia or detrimental to its interests.
• Strategically India-US relations are designed to provide greater political space as well as maneuverability for India’s relation with China.
• On issues of strategic interest to Russia like Ukraine, Crimea, Syria, Georgia, etc., India has always expressed understanding of Russian position.
• Modi also needs to sensitize Putin of the potential damage that Russia’s supply of lethal armaments like MI 35 attack helicopters and SU 35 aircraft to Pakistan can have on relations with India as all such equipment is ultimately used by Pakistan against India.
• Oil and gas and the nuclear energy sector have shown commendable progress over recent months. Momentum in these areas needs to be sustained and further stepped up.
• Bilateral trade has continued to perform far below potential. Bilateral trade needs to be brought to a decent level of USD 30 billion by 2025 as against the current level of below 10 billion.
• India’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will provide a valuable opportunity for the two countries to strengthen their partnership.
• India’s potential participation in the Eurasian Economic Union will be a win-win proposition for all members of the grouping.
• The agreement on the construction of the Chabahar seaport, associated rail-road linkages and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor will spur ties between India and Russia as well as with Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Need of the hour

• Both countries should strengthen bilateral ties in the spheres of strategic, political, security, nuclear energy, hydrocarbons, defence procurement, academia and people to people relations.
• India and Russia are natural allies. It is in the interest of both countries to have vibrant relations. The responsibility for this devolves upon Modi and Putin.
• Both are charismatic and decisive leaders. Their track records prove that they have the vision and capacity to once again achieve heights in bilateral relations earlier witnessed during the Soviet times.

Shared China concerns

• It is the shared perception of a Chinese threat which brought Delhi and Moscow together.
• The end of the Cold War changed this, with Russia no longer looking at China as a current security threat. The early settlement of their border dispute, the expansion in their economic and trade relations and the emergence of China as a major recipient of Russian weapons and defence technologies brought about an asymmetry in perceptions of China between India and Russia.
• But Russian perceptions of a long-term Chinese challenge to its interests persisted, and still do. For example, Russian nuclear experts have been reluctant to deep cuts in nuclear weapons in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. precisely because the gap with China’s expanding and qualitatively better nuclear arsenal is diminishing and this heightens Russian concerns.
• Chinese inroads into Central Asia and Eastern Europe are also a concern for Russia, which regards both these regions as part of its strategic periphery.

What this means for India?

• We need to adjust to a new and more positive phase in Russia-China relations.
• We shouldn’t rely on Moscow to confront Chinese hostility towards India or support India against Pakistan.
• We should seek to build a broader framework of relations based on the longer-term Russian concerns about the emergence of China.
• Russia, like India, prefers a multipolar world and is unlikely to accept a junior league status in a Chinese-dominated world. For the same reason, Russia may welcome a higher-profile role by India in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In this context, India should pursue the proposed Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and seek to play a more active role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a member.
• A more united and coherent European Union may well be open to re-engaging with Russia, and this should be encouraged by India. In an increasingly fluid international situation, an India which has strong relations with the U.S., Western Europe and Russia is in a unique position to play a larger geopolitical role. It can use its enhanced relations with each to upgrade its relations with the other major powers. This will also diminish Chinese pressures on India.

Russia and India Relationships as balance of world power

Moscow and Beijing openly coordinate positions on these issues

1. In the UN Security Council.
2. In RIC, SCO, and BRICS.
3. Have military, economic, energy, and social ties.
4. Have similar interests and priorities in Central Asia and Middle East.
5. Present an alternative viewpoint to the Western-dominated global discourse.

Post-Cold War Sino-Russian relations are a reflection of tactical pragmatism in both countries. As long as the glue binding Russia and China is their shared interest in balancing the US, at least for the next few years, China and Russia will remain close partners, creating all the necessary preconditions for transforming this tactical proximity into a strategic partnership.

Implications for India

• India will find its strategic options increasingly constrained if a Sino-Russian strategic partnership emerges.
• In the event of Russia and China becoming closer to one another, India will have to either cooperate with Russia and China, or balance against them by drawing closer to the US.
• If the growing relationship develops into a Russian dependency on China, then closer coordination between Russia and China in multilateral fora like BRICS, SCO, and RIC, would constrain India's options.
• If Russia starts supplying high technology to China in the military sphere, India's security could be compromised. There is also the possibility of Russia growing closer to Pakistan because of China's influence.
• Strategies to be followed by India to protect its national interests
• Deepen its relationship with Russia, because Russia is an important balancer for India vis-à-vis China;
• Within the framework of the excellent military relationship with Russia, India needs to impress upon Russia that it should not transfer technology to China that could prove to be detrimental to India's security in the long run.
• Promote mutually beneficial trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India that could contribute towards reduction of mistrust and suspicion between India and China;
• Similarly, pursue policies that will increase China's dependency on India;
• Finally, develop closer ties with the United States aimed at developing a new trilateral—US-Russia-India—that could balance any moves towards a strategic partnership between China and Russia.
• Russia-Pakistan Rapprochement and implications for India-Russia relations?
• Islamabad and Moscow have traditionally been constrained by their respective partnerships with Washington and Delhi.
• In the last couple of years, however, Islamabad and Moscow have started moving closer to each other, because of differences between Washington and Islamabad and the growing closeness between Washington and New Delhi.

Russia's Motives

• Russia regards Pakistan to be a necessary part of any long-term solution in Afghanistan, as it is a key to a stable Afghanistan particularly to convince Pakistan to moderate the Taliban and to subdue radical Islamic forces within Pakistan.
• Pakistan has a large and influential Muslim country and Russia has a large Muslim population of its own.
• With the drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan, Russia hopes to create strategic space for itself in the region. Russia's turn towards Pakistan to fit with its own pivot to Asia, through which it wants to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific region.
• Russia is also of the view that building better relations with Pakistan will partially counter any alignment between India and the US and could help impede India from getting too close to the US.
• With India diversifying its basket of arms , Russia believes that it is justified in looking for new markets for its arms and technology.
• Russia wants a land route, which will give it access to the warm-water ports in the Arabian Sea: Pakistan is best placed to meet such demand. This could also open up new opportunities for the landlocked countries of Central Asia.
• Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been isolated in the international sphere and has few friends left. Russia now tries to reach out to new friends and partners who canhelp it challenge the West.

Pakistan's Motives

• Pakistan wants to build better relations with Russia to increase its leverage with the US.
• Given the recent tensions between the US and Pakistan and between the US and Russia, Pakistan wants to prove to the US that it has other strategic options which might not necessarily be liked by US.

Implications for India-Russia relations

• Despite its newfound closeness to Russia, Pakistan is unlikely to jeopardise its relationship with the US. After all, it continues to receive vast amounts of military aid and financial assistance from the US.
• Given Russia’s special relationship with India, it again seems unlikely that Russia will jeopardise its relationship with India over Pakistan.
• While fears of a China-Russia-Pakistan axis and subsequent geostrategic encirclement of India may be overblown, India must remain alert to ward off any such possibility.
• It should do this by deepening and broadening its relationships with all three countries involved, as well as the US.
• Even though Russia has lost out on a few major contracts in recent times, it remains one of India's major arms suppliers India still buys around $2 billion worth of military equipment from Russia every year.

Defence, nuclear, energy ties

• India and Russia should focus on maintaining and expanding their already considerable cooperation in the defence hardware and nuclear energy sector. Both sectors are important to Russia as well as to India.
• The loss of the Indian market in these two areas would be a blow to Russia and they would deprive India of advanced technology not always accessible elsewhere.
• Since the end of the Cold War, India sought to establish a strong, long-term energy partnership with Russia. While some important deals like the Sakhalin oil and gas project have been a success, the early promise of expanding cooperation in this sector has been mostly belied.
• Russia has seen its interests better served by giving priority to Western Europe and China. India has been rather low on the radar.
• In St. Petersburg, there was a reference to India and Russia setting up an “energy corridor” and another reference to the use of natural gas as a relatively clean and climate-friendly fuel. This must be followed up with some concrete and practical steps.

Conclusion

Russia’s current closeness to China is tactical; its long-term interest both globally and in its neighborhood are not aligned with China. India should pursue its relations with Russia keeping this reality in mind. This 18th annual India-Russia summit appears to have been more substantive than the previous ones. The altered context has to be acknowledged by both sides and there should be an unsentimental reckoning of both the challenges and opportunities that could define India-Russia relations in the new millennium.