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A battle that turned into a death trap
The battle of Nam Ka Chu is one that is recalled every time one talks about the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Planned by the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru\'s handpicked Lt Gen BM \'Bijji\' Kaul, it turned out to be a death trap for the soldiers deployed - the troops waiting for the end knowing it was a lost battle, recounts a new book.
The book ‘1962, The War That Wasn't’ by military historian and filmmaker Shiv Kunal Verma, presents an exhaustive account of the war that is still wrapped in mystery
The battle of Nam Ka Chu is one that is recalled every time one talks about the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Planned by the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's handpicked Lt Gen BM 'Bijji' Kaul, it turned out to be a death trap for the soldiers deployed - the troops waiting for the end knowing it was a lost battle, recounts a new book.
Around 11 days before Indian soldiers were slaughtered in the infamous Nam Ka Chu battle Lt Gen Kaul had been camping in the area for around four days. He was outlining a plan of attack to occupy the Thagla ridge across Nam Ka Chu. "Every officer and JCO present at the briefing knew the general's plan was nonsensical," the book says.
Subedar Dashrath Singh, one of the few survivors of the battle, whose account is recorded in the book, raised an alarm. "This is the first time I've seen a battle being planned where we are sitting in the valley while the enemy is holding heights above us," the book quotes the subedar as saying.
In another chapter however, Verma also presents the other side of the story, when Lt Gen Kaul proposed to withdraw troops from Nam Ka Chu at a meeting in New Delhi attended by Nehru, defence minister V K Krishna Menon, then army chief General Pran Thapar and top military officers in New Delhi. The idea was shot down by Gen. Thapar and the Eastern Army Commander, Lt Gen Bogey Sen.
The events around Nam Ka Chu sum up India's failure at planning in the war, but the book goes further back into history, mentioning the 1914 Shimla accord, China's annexation of Tibet and India's silence over this despite intelligence inputs that the US was willing to help in a covert operation.
In 1950, when China made it clear it was annexing Tibet, BN Mullik, the then head of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), had suggested armed intervention. The Americans had promised air support and were willing to airlift an Indian brigade to Chamdo in Eastern Tibet.
The army chief, General (later Field Marshal) KM Cariappa, however turned it down, saying India did not have troops to spare. In what may be called the sum of the 1962 debacle, the author writes: "The Chinese played their cards in such a manner that the Indians lost what should have been at best a defensive war by not fighting it at all."
