Understanding India’s Nuclear Policy

Nuclear Dilemmas
• Nuclearization has had unforeseen consequences for India security.
• Though nuclear weapons, the perfect status quo weapon, has benefits for a status quo power such as India, there are also some concerns about what it does to the military balance in South Asia.
• By neutralizing India’s conventional superiority, nuclear weapons may have been partly responsible for hobbling India’s cavacity to react to Pakistan’s constant provocations. Both the Kargil crisis (1999) and the Parakram crisis (2001— 2002) demonstrated this.
• In Kargil, despite unambiguous evidence of Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control (LoC), the Indian military response was limited to dealing with the forces that had already crossed the LoC rather than with attacking their support bases across the LoC or punishing Pakistan for that misadventure.
• New Delhi was extremely careful not to allow its forces to cross the LoC, giving strict instructions to its military, including the air force, that it must stay within Indian territory.
• Such orders constrained Indian military operations, but were nevertheless seen as necessary to prevent any escalation to a full-scale war, with potential consequences for further escalation to the nuclear level.
• But Pakistan also miscalculated the Indian response: Pakistani military leadership had apparently assumed that India cannot react at all to the military incursions in Kargil because of New Delhi’s fear of nuclear escalation.
• They were wrong in that calculation but fear of nuclear escalation did limit the Indian response to India’s side of the LoC.
• The Parakram crisis showed similar results. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, India ordered full military mobilization.
• Despite some initial fear at the Indian response Pakistan stood its ground, calculating that India would not risk nuclear escalation by launching a military attack.
• They were right: India ultimately backed down with little achieved. India’s restraint in dealing with the attack on the Indian parliament once again demonstrated the limitations that nuclear weapons imposed on India’s capacity to respond to Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a strategy.
• India used the military mobilization essentially as a way of putting pressure on Pakistan, as well as putting pressure on the U.S. to lean on Pakistan, rather than as a prelude to the use of force.
• In 2008, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked both the Indian embassy in Afghanistan as well as the city of Mumbai and there is evidence that both attacks had Pakistan’s official sanction.
• This time, unlike in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian government did not even appear to have considered retaliatory strategies.
• India’s inability to respond is another excellent demonstration of how debilitating the fear of nuclear escalation has been in terms of Indian policy.
• As a RAND report on the Mumbai attack pointed out, “(A)fter becoming an overt nuclear power, Pakistan has become emboldened to prosecute conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, confident that nuclear weapons minimize the likelihood of an Indian military reaction.”
• It would be difficult to lay on the blame for India’s pusillanimity on nuclear weapons alone.
• India’s divided government (every government in the last two decades has been a coalition) as well as Indian political culture make India very risk averse.
• And after overt nuclearization, and especially after 9/11, any potential war between. India and Pakistan raises even greater international concern than before.
• Nevertheless, fear of nuclear escalation probably plays a greater role than other factors in determining the Indian response. India has tried to deal with such problems in at least two ways.
• In the immediate aftermath of Kargil, Indian military and political leaders suggested that despite nuclearization India has the space to fight a limited conventional war.

• This suggested that India could wage a full-scale conventional war against Pakistan without the worry that it might escalate to the nuclear level.
• This `limited war doctrine’ appears to have been purely declaratory and talk of such limited war options died down almost immediately.
• It is unclear if these. pronouncements were the result of any politically approved strategy; the fact that such ideas were quickly forgotten suggests that these were more personal ruminations than any state policy.
• Again, after the Parakram crisis, the Indian Army came up with what they called the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
• Cold start was the idea that India would station sufficient troops at the border to start offensive operation immediately, without waiting for a full-scale mobilization. Such offensives would be in the form of multiple but shallow attacks across the entire India – Pakistan border.
• Again, it is unclear if such plans have any political backing.
• In any case, the problem was not the speed of launching an offensive but the question of whether there can be any military response at all under nuclear conditions.
• Though the army and other services have conducted several military exercises to test out elements of the CoGudipati Rajendra Kumar

Nuclear Dilemmas
• Nuclearization has had unforeseen consequences for India security.
• Though nuclear weapons, the perfect status quo weapon, has benefits for a status quo power such as India, there are also some concerns about what it does to the military balance in South Asia.
• By neutralizing India’s conventional superiority, nuclear weapons may have been partly responsible for hobbling India’s cavacity to react to Pakistan’s constant provocations. Both the Kargil crisis (1999) and the Parakram crisis (2001— 2002) demonstrated this.
• In Kargil, despite unambiguous evidence of Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control (LoC), the Indian military response was limited to dealing with the forces that had already crossed the LoC rather than with attacking their support bases across the LoC or punishing Pakistan for that misadventure.
• New Delhi was extremely careful not to allow its forces to cross the LoC, giving strict instructions to its military, including the air force, that it must stay within Indian territory.
• Such orders constrained Indian military operations, but were nevertheless seen as necessary to prevent any escalation to a full-scale war, with potential consequences for further escalation to the nuclear level.
• But Pakistan also miscalculated the Indian response: Pakistani military leadership had apparently assumed that India cannot react at all to the military incursions in Kargil because of New Delhi’s fear of nuclear escalation.
• They were wrong in that calculation but fear of nuclear escalation did limit the Indian response to India’s side of the LoC.
• The Parakram crisis showed similar results. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, India ordered full military mobilization.
• Despite some initial fear at the Indian response Pakistan stood its ground, calculating that India would not risk nuclear escalation by launching a military attack.
• They were right: India ultimately backed down with little achieved. India’s restraint in dealing with the attack on the Indian parliament once again demonstrated the limitations that nuclear weapons imposed on India’s capacity to respond to Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a strategy.
• India used the military mobilization essentially as a way of putting pressure on Pakistan, as well as putting pressure on the U.S. to lean on Pakistan, rather than as a prelude to the use of force.
• In 2008, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked both the Indian embassy in Afghanistan as well as the city of Mumbai and there is evidence that both attacks had Pakistan’s official sanction.
• This time, unlike in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian government did not even appear to have considered retaliatory strategies.
• India’s inability to respond is another excellent demonstration of how debilitating the fear of nuclear escalation has been in terms of Indian policy.
• As a RAND report on the Mumbai attack pointed out, “(A)fter becoming an overt nuclear power, Pakistan has become emboldened to prosecute conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, confident that nuclear weapons minimize the likelihood of an Indian military reaction.”
• It would be difficult to lay on the blame for India’s pusillanimity on nuclear weapons alone.
• India’s divided government (every government in the last two decades has been a coalition) as well as Indian political culture make India very risk averse.
• And after overt nuclearization, and especially after 9/11, any potential war between. India and Pakistan raises even greater international concern than before.
• Nevertheless, fear of nuclear escalation probably plays a greater role than other factors in determining the Indian response. India has tried to deal with such problems in at least two ways.
• In the immediate aftermath of Kargil, Indian military and political leaders suggested that despite nuclearization India has the space to fight a limited conventional war.

• This suggested that India could wage a full-scale conventional war against Pakistan without the worry that it might escalate to the nuclear level.
• This `limited war doctrine’ appears to have been purely declaratory and talk of such limited war options died down almost immediately.
• It is unclear if these. pronouncements were the result of any politically approved strategy; the fact that such ideas were quickly forgotten suggests that these were more personal ruminations than any state policy.
• Again, after the Parakram crisis, the Indian Army came up with what they called the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
• Cold start was the idea that India would station sufficient troops at the border to start offensive operation immediately, without waiting for a full-scale mobilization. Such offensives would be in the form of multiple but shallow attacks across the entire India – Pakistan border.
• Again, it is unclear if such plans have any political backing.
• In any case, the problem was not the speed of launching an offensive but the question of whether there can be any military response at all under nuclear conditions.
• Though the army and other services have conducted several military exercises to test out elements of the Cold Start doctrine, its political status remains uncertain. No political leaders have so far used the concept publicly or spoken about it.
• The key problem facing the Indian decision-makers is not so much the speed with which Indian forces can be mobilized — which is what Cold Start is designed to address — but the question of whether there are any military solutions to the problem of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism itself.
• This remains a continuing and key problem for New Delhi. Until this issue is resolved, there is little that a ‘cold start’ doctrine can actually accomplish.
Nuclear Arms Control
• Over the last several decades, India has emphasized nuclear disarmament rather than nuclear non-proliferation. New Delhi’s position on the spread of nuclear weapons was a complex one.
• On the one hand, India always saw such spread of nuclear weapons as a danger.
• Its decision not to sign the NPT despite taking part in the negotiations was a difficult one, reached after New Delhi concluded that signing the treaty would adversely affect Indian security especially because neither Washington nor Moscow appeared willing to provide any form of extended deterrence cover for India’s security. in other words, India never accepted the idea that nuclear proliferation was legitimate, unlike, for example, China in the 1950s and 1960s.
• Therefore, through New Delhi refused to sign the NPT, it also refused to help other states such as Libya with nuclear technology.
• New Delhi was also quite meticulous about ensuring that its nuclear weapons technology did not reach other non-nuclear weapon states.
• Though there bade been some concerns raised that India might have g illegally acquired some technologies acid materials, and that it may have been careless in ensuring the security of some of its nuclear technology, the Indian record in protecting its technology from leaking is far better than that of most other nuclear powers.
• In the process, New Delhi built up a reputation as a ‘responsible nuclear power’ that became an unexpected bonus in dealing with the international community, especially as India sought a waiver from NSG guidelines.
• India squared this circle of both opposing the NPT and opposing nuclear proliferation by taking the position that though each country should be free to decide on how to meet its security needs, states that did sign the NPT had an obligation to live up to their commitments.
• Thus, on both North Korea and Iran, India’s position has been to argue that because these countries voluntarily accepted the NPT, they have an obligation to live up to their treaty commitments.
• India’s response to the threat of nuclear proliferation was to take an active part in nuclear disarmament diplomacy, seeing the elimination of nuclear weapons as both a way of dealing with the threat of proliferation as also a way of avoiding the unpleasant decision about building its own nuclear weapons.
• India also was at the forefront in pressing that all commitments in the NPT be honored, including the Article 6 obligation towards nuclear disarmament, rather than focusing only on the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.
• Thus, a favorite Indian argument about nuclear proliferation was to point out that what mattered was not just horizontal proliferation (or the expansion of the nuclear weapons club) but also vertical proliferation (the expansion of the arsenals of the existing members of the nuclear club).
• Nevertheless, as the global nuclear non-proliferation regime comes under increasing threat due to non-compliance or even outright violations by countries such as Iran and North Korea, India will have to increasingly face up to the needs of fashioning a more appropriate approach to the non-proliferation regime.
• in addition to focusing on nuclear disarmament and non-compliance by NWS (Nuclear Weapon States), India will also have to come up with meaningful and effective ways of dealing with non-compliance by NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States), something that India had previously ignored.
• One of the disadvantages that India faces in making this policy transition is that India is not a member of the NPT and it is unlikely to become one unless India’s de facto NWS status is accepted as de jure status by the NPT members. This is unlikely.
• But the alternative — India giving up its nuclear weapons and joining the treaty as a NNWS is equally unlikely.
• In essence, then, India’s relationship with the treaty is unlikely to undergo any formal changes though India can be expected to play a more active diplomatic role in trying to keep the NPT system together.
• As stated earlier, India is likely to continue stressing nuclear disarmament as a way of resolving the problems of nuclear proliferation.
• Though India’s disarmament drive is sometimes seen a cynical ploy to divert attention from its unwillingness to accede to the NPT, a good number among India’s political and administrative elite appear sincerely committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon free world.
• This may very well be because no serious cost-benefit analysis has been undertaken within the government of the implications of nuclear disarmament on India’s security interest.
• If so, it would not be the first time: India originally supported both the NPT and the CTBT without realizing the full import of these treaties on India’s security. India eventually refused to accede to either treaty.
• Nevertheless, India does strongly support a Nuclear Weapons Convention with the objective of eventual comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
• Even after openly declaring itself as a nuclear weapon state, India has reiterated its commitment to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
• Obviously, nuclear disarmament is unlikely in the immediate future. In the meantime, India faces some key nuclear arms control challenges in the next couple of years.
• The most immediate of these issues are those related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Control Treaty'(FMCT).
• For New Delhi, the CTBT is a domestic rather more than an international problem. There is a continuing dispute within the Indian defence science community about the success of the H-bomb test in 1998.
• A section of India’s scientific community, mostly retired scientists, has argued that the H-bomb test was not successful and that India should test again.
• The Indian government as well as serving nuclear scientists have repeatedly stated that they are satisfied with the results of the 1998 tests and no further tests are necessary.
• In addition, there is some disquiet among some members of the Indian strategic community about India signing the CTBT after just six tests.
• Both of these concerns make for serious and rather vocal opposition to any moves by New Delhi to sign the CTBT.
• Though the government can overcome such opposition, it would require the kind of political commitment that the current government has so far not suggested it is willing to expend.
• Thus, they are hoping that either opposition in the US Senate or some other problem will slow the CTBT.
• The loss of momentum in the U.S. Senate on the CTBT thus comes as good news to New Delhi.
• In any case, it is highly unlikely that New Delhi will sign the CTBT in the near future given such domestic issues, unless all the main nuclear powers sign and ratify the treaty.
• The FMCT presents a different and more serious problem. it is unclear if India’s fissile material stockpiles are sufficient to meet India’s current and future strategic needs. India agreed to join the FMCT negotiations, one suspects, with the same short-sightedness that it joined the NPT and CTBT negotiations.
• From New Delhi’s perspective, the FMCT is thankfully tied up in a number of controversies, especially the lone about the scope of the treaty.
• But should these problems be resolved India might suddenly find itself once again staring at a treaty that it helped negotiate but which does not serve its needs.
• But unlike like the CTBT, the FMCT is not so much a domestic political issue as a practical issue that has to do with decisions about the size of the nuclear arsenal that India wants.
• Until now, Indian decisionmakers have been reluctant to make these decisions, and they can be expected to put off such decisions for as long as possible.

The implications of the US – India Nuclear Deal
• The US — India nuclear deal was essential to India because India’s traditional approach towards nuclear cooperation had reached a dead-end.
• Traditionally, India sought international nuclear cooperation, even while maintaining a nuclear weapons program, by agreeing to partial safeguards on nuclear imports.
• This strategy allowed India to supplement its dome6tic nuclear power capability with international cooperation, as long as there were willing international partners.
• However, when the rules of international nuclear commerce changed from partial safeguards (safeguards only on the specific imported item) to full-scope safeguards (safeguards on the entire nuclear program as a condition for any nuclear commerce), India was faced with the choice of either giving up its nuclear weapons program,
or giving up on international nuclear commerce.
• Not surprisingly, India chose the latter. What the US — India nuclear deal does is give India the option yet again to both keep its nuclear weapons program while also preserving its access to international nuclear commerce.
• The issue had become even more vital for India because India’s explosive economic growth has put much greater strains on its electricity generation capacity, leading to peak power shortages of as such as 11 percent.
• Now that the nuclear deal is complete, and India has the necessary waiver from the MSG that permits other nuclear powers such as France and Russia to supply India with civilian nuclear technology, India is expected to significantly enhance its civilian nuclear power sector with international cooperation.
• Indeed, several agreements have already been signed to bring to fruition additional nuclear power generating capacity and more nuclear power agreements are expected to be signed over the next two years.
• The nuclear deal is unlikely to have major impact on India’s nuclear weapons program. In the last two decades, ever since India went nuclear in the late 1980s, India has only built a few dozen nuclear warheads.
• Most estimates suggest that India has enough fissile material for about 65 -110 warheads, with some estimates suggesting even lower numbers.
• If we assume a median of 85 warheads, it would suggest that India has only built, on average, about four warheads a year.
• This suggests that India feels no great pressure to rapidly increase its arsenal.
• The suggestion, by some arms control experts, that access to foreign nuclear fuel will free India’s domestic fuel resources for weapons does not hold much water because India has much larger stockpiles of fuel (about one ton) that it could have converted for weapons if it had wanted to do so.
• In other words, the small size of the Indian nuclear force is the consequence of deliberate choice rather than because of any fissile material shortage.
• India’s nuclear policy has evolved gradually rather than dramatically. This is unlikely to change. Indian leaders and the political and administrative system are cautious and risk-averse.
• And India faces no existential insecurities and is indeed a fairly confident and secure state that dominates its region.
• Thus, there is little domestic political or international reasons to expect rapid changes in India’s nuclear policy. But just as it is cautious in advancing its nuclear weapons arsenal, it will also be cautious in advancing on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda.
• India is unlikely to sign either the CTBT or the FMCT, should they he presented to New Delhi in the next couple of years.
• On the other hand, India is also unlikely to stage more nuclear tests or hugely increase its nuclear arsenal. Over the next decade, India should be expected to gradually increase the size of its arsenal and make it more robust and reliable, with some 6000 kilometer plus range ballistic missiles and possibly one or two submarines capable of firing long-range ballistic missiles.
• India has sought BMDs for over a decade. Though it is possible that India might buy a BMD system or develop one indigenously, it is unlikely that such systems will be deployed in the next few years.
• India can also be expected to campaign vigorously for nuclear disarmament.
• New Delhi can also be expected to continue to worry about the negotion of its conventional military deterrent, but it is unlikely that it will find a solution to this puzzle either in the immediate future.

How do International security problems the reason for the quest for nuclear weapons?
• In the present international security problems that the current ban movement and the nuclear prohibition treaty have trouble addressing.
• States facing potentially existential threats find few alternatives to nuclear deterrence.
• Many states will join the treaty in the hope that it will stigmatise nuclear weapons but many states will reject the treaty and continue to hope that nuclear weapons and alliances backed by them will guarantee their security.
• Indeed, states with nuclear weapons are now engaged in efforts to modernise their arsenals to be useful for decades to come.
• The U.S. is considering building smaller nuclear weapons to target buried facilities.
• Pakistan has tested nuclear weapons that could be deployed on the battlefield.
• Russia may be developing new, intermediate-range missiles in contravention of an arms control treaty with the U.S.
• India has been deploying nuclear weapons on new submarines.
• China is fielding new long-range missiles with multiple nuclear warheads.
• North Koreais racing to test and field a scary array of nuclear missiles.
• None of the weapons possessors seems particularly concerned with the stigma created by the prohibition treaty.
Role of civil societies in searching for middle ground
• For international civil society actors who support the objective of disarmament, this international situation presents an uncomfortable choice. In reality the prohibition and nuclear disarmament camps are so divided that it is difficult to find credible middle ground.
• But there are useful means to push both sides towards a safer world.
• In states possessing nuclear weapons, civil society actors can challenge the most expansive and dangerous ideas that extend nuclear deterrence objectives to absurd ends.
• Sharp analysis can highlight the negative outcomes of nuclear deterrence policy.
• It is useful to foster debate that forces policymakers to justify their investment in nuclear weapons.
• In states desiring to prohibit nuclear weapons, civil society actors can encourage actions and policies that aim to mitigate security threats that drive demand for nuclear weapons.
• Strengthening international institutions and mechanisms that prevent proliferation and enhance the credible peaceful uses of nuclear technology is a critical enabler of disarmament.
Way Forward
• Success in expanding the middle ground between nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence will require the same ambition and idealism that drove the conclusion of the nuclear prohibition treaty.
• It will require innovation and perseverance to identify and promote mechanisms to reduce risks of nuclear use.
• It will require building trust that states and civil society actors on either side of the debate share the objective of mutual security.
• The relationship between the ban treaty and other treaties such as the NPT, the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), and nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, has to be clearly specified. ld Start doctrine, its political status remains uncertain. No political leaders have so far used the concept publicly or spoken about it.
• The key problem facing the Indian decision-makers is not so much the speed with which Indian forces can be mobilized — which is what Cold Start is designed to address — but the question of whether there are any military solutions to the problem of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism itself.
• This remains a continuing and key problem for New Delhi. Until this issue is resolved, there is little that a ‘cold start’ doctrine can actually accomplish.

Nuclear Arms Control
• Over the last several decades, India has emphasized nuclear disarmament rather than nuclear non-proliferation. New Delhi’s position on the spread of nuclear weapons was a complex one.
• On the one hand, India always saw such spread of nuclear weapons as a danger.
• Its decision not to sign the NPT despite taking part in the negotiations was a difficult one, reached after New Delhi concluded that signing the treaty would adversely affect Indian security especially because neither Washington nor Moscow appeared willing to provide any form of extended deterrence cover for India’s security. in other words, India never accepted the idea that nuclear proliferation was legitimate, unlike, for example, China in the 1950s and 1960s.
• Therefore, through New Delhi refused to sign the NPT, it also refused to help other states such as Libya with nuclear technology.
• New Delhi was also quite meticulous about ensuring that its nuclear weapons technology did not reach other non-nuclear weapon states.
• Though there bade been some concerns raised that India might have g illegally acquired some technologies acid materials, and that it may have been careless in ensuring the security of some of its nuclear technology, the Indian record in protecting its technology from leaking is far better than that of most other nuclear powers.
• In the process, New Delhi built up a reputation as a ‘responsible nuclear power’ that became an unexpected bonus in dealing with the international community, especially as India sought a waiver from NSG guidelines.
• India squared this circle of both opposing the NPT and opposing nuclear proliferation by taking the position that though each country should be free to decide on how to meet its security needs, states that did sign the NPT had an obligation to live up to their commitments.
• Thus, on both North Korea and Iran, India’s position has been to argue that because these countries voluntarily accepted the NPT, they have an obligation to live up to their treaty commitments.
• India’s response to the threat of nuclear proliferation was to take an active part in nuclear disarmament diplomacy, seeing the elimination of nuclear weapons as both a way of dealing with the threat of proliferation as also a way of avoiding the unpleasant decision about building its own nuclear weapons.
• India also was at the forefront in pressing that all commitments in the NPT be honored, including the Article 6 obligation towards nuclear disarmament, rather than focusing only on the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.
• Thus, a favorite Indian argument about nuclear proliferation was to point out that what mattered was not just horizontal proliferation (or the expansion of the nuclear weapons club) but also vertical proliferation (the expansion of the arsenals of the existing members of the nuclear club).
• Nevertheless, as the global nuclear non-proliferation regime comes under increasing threat due to non-compliance or even outright violations by countries such as Iran and North Korea, India will have to increasingly face up to the needs of fashioning a more appropriate approach to the non-proliferation regime.
• in addition to focusing on nuclear disarmament and non-compliance by NWS (Nuclear Weapon States), India will also have to come up with meaningful and effective ways of dealing with non-compliance by NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States), something that India had previously ignored.
• One of the disadvantages that India faces in making this policy transition is that India is not a member of the NPT and it is unlikely to become one unless India’s de facto NWS status is accepted as de jure status by the NPT members. This is unlikely.
• But the alternative — India giving up its nuclear weapons and joining the treaty as a NNWS is equally unlikely.
• In essence, then, India’s relationship with the treaty is unlikely to undergo any formal changes though India can be expected to play a more active diplomatic role in trying to keep the NPT system together.
• As stated earlier, India is likely to continue stressing nuclear disarmament as a way of resolving the problems of nuclear proliferation.
• Though India’s disarmament drive is sometimes seen a cynical ploy to divert attention from its unwillingness to accede to the NPT, a good number among India’s political and administrative elite appear sincerely committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon free world.
• This may very well be because no serious cost-benefit analysis has been undertaken within the government of the implications of nuclear disarmament on India’s security interest.
• If so, it would not be the first time: India originally supported both the NPT and the CTBT without realizing the full import of these treaties on India’s security. India eventually refused to accede to either treaty.
• Nevertheless, India does strongly support a Nuclear Weapons Convention with the objective of eventual comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
• Even after openly declaring itself as a nuclear weapon state, India has reiterated its commitment to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
• Obviously, nuclear disarmament is unlikely in the immediate future. In the meantime, India faces some key nuclear arms control challenges in the next couple of years.
• The most immediate of these issues are those related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Control Treaty'(FMCT).
• For New Delhi, the CTBT is